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THE MARYLAND CONSTRUCfION TRUST STATUTE: 
NEW PERSONAL LIABILITY-ITS SCOPE AND 
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY IMPLICATIONS 
David F. Albright, Jr.t 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1987, the Maryland General Assembly enacted a new statute en-
titled "Trust Relationships in the Construction Industry"l (the "con-
struction trust statute"), codified in sections 9-201 through 9-204 of the 
Real Property article of the Maryland Annotated Code.2 This new stat-
ute, located immediately after the subtitle entitled "Mechanics' Liens" 
(the "mechanics' lien statute"),3 is designed to complement the latter and 
to reinforce the rights and responsibilities of contractors and subcontrac-
tors in the construction industry. To implement these objectives, the 
construction trust statute designates monies received by a contractor or a 
subcontractor on a construction project as trust funds for the payment of 
sums due to lower-tiered subcontractors.4 
As with any new statute, a number of questions arise concerning the 
interpretation and effect of the construction trust statute. Perhaps the 
most important of these questions involves the personal liability of of-
ficers, directors, and employees of contractors and subcontractors. First, 
this article reviews the Maryland mechanics' lien statute as well as ana-
lyzes the content and history of the construction trust statute. Next, it 
examines the circumstances in which officers, directors, and employees of 
contractors and subcontractors may be held personally liable under the 
construction trust statute. Finally, this article discusses whether officers, 
directors, and employees who are found personally liable under the con-
struction trust statute will be able to obtain a discharge of their debts by 
filing bankruptcy. 
II. CONTENT AND HISTORY OF THE MARYLAND 
CONSTRUCTION TRUST STATUTE 
A. The Mechanics' Lien Statute 
A review of the mechanics' lien statute will facilitate comprehension 
of the purpose and operation of the construction trust statute. Although 
the mechanics' lien statute provides contractors and subcontractors with 
an effective means of collecting sums due and owing from owners and 
t A.B., 1978, Harvard University; J.D., 1981, Georgetown University Law Center; 
Associate, Horn, Bennett & Redmond, P.A., Baltimore, Maryland; Co-Chairman, 
Construction Case Subcommittee, Maryland State Bar Association. 
1. 1987 Md. Laws 345. 
2. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 9-201 to -204 (1988) (effective July I, 1987). 
3. Id. §§ 9-101 to -114. 
4. Id. § 9-201. 
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contractors on a construction project, it fails to impose liability directly 
on the individuals who are responsible for causing the problem. 
The mechanics' lien statute enables unpaid contractorsS and subcon-
tractors6 to assert a lien against the property for which they provided 
labor and/or materials.7 Except where single family dwellings are in-
volved,8 the statute imposes no limitation upon the maximum amount 
which a contractor or subcontractor may claim.9 
When a property owner receives notice from a subcontractor of in-
tent to claim a mechanics' lien, the owner is entitled to withhold from the 
contractor who employed the subcontractor, the amount that the owner 
ascertains is due all subcontractors of that contractor. 1O If, however, the 
amount of all subcontractor liens asserted against the property exceeds 
the balance due the contractor, section 9-104(f) of the Maryland Real 
Property Code provides no protection to the property owner. The owner 
is entitled to indemnification from the contractor for all subcontractors' 
liens that the owner is required to pay, II but this right of indemnity may 
be worthless if the contractor is insolvent. Because the term "subcon-
tractor" is so broadly defined under the mechani,cs' lien statute,12 the 
owner's property may be subject to liens from lower-tiered suppliers, sub-
subcontractors, and even laborers. The total may be many times greater 
than the amount withheld from the contractor. Similarly, a solvent con-
tractor who has contractually agreed to indemnify the owner from claims 
of lower-tiered subcontractors and suppliers may encounter the same 
problem if one of his subcontractors becomes insolvent. 
5. A "contractor" is any person who has a contract with an owner. [d. § 9-101(d). 
6. Under the mechanics' lien statute, a "subcontractor" is any person who has a con-
tract with anyone except the owner or his agent. [d. § 9-101(g). The court of ap-
peals has not limited who may assert a mechanics' lien based upon where the 
claimant stands in the contract chain. National Elec. Indus. Fund v. Bethlehem 
Steel Corp., 296 Md. 541, 547-48, 463 A.2d 858, 861 (1983) (individual employees 
of subcontractor entitled to claim mechanic's lien); Diener v. Cubbage, 259 Md. 
555, 563, 270 A.2d 471, 475-76 (1970) (labor and material sub-subcontractors may 
claim mechanics' lien). Further, the claimant need not be in contractual privity 
with the owner of the property. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-105 (1988); 
Sodini v. Winter, 32 Md. 130 (1870). 
7. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a) (1988). 
8. Section 9-104(f)(3) provides: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the contrary, the 
lien of the subcontractor against a single family dwelling being erected on 
the land of the owner for his own residence shall not exceed the amount by 
which the owner is indebted under the contract at the time the notice is 
given. 
MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(f)(3) (1988). 
9. The Maryland mechanics' lien statute is different in this respect from other states' 
statutes which permit a subcontractor to assert a lien only to the extent of the 
amount due and owing from the owner to the contractor. See, e.g., D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 38-104 (1981); VA. CODE ANN. § 43-7 (1986). 
10. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-104(f) (1988). 
11. 74 AM. JUR. 20 Suretyship § 171 (1974); A. STEARNS, THE LAW OF SURETYSHIP 
§ 11.8 (5th ed. 1951). 
12. See supra note 6. 
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B. Legislative History of the Construction Trust Statute 
The legislative history of the Maryland construction trust statute 
indicates concern in the construction industry about subcontractors who 
fail to pay their bills, close their doors, and then reopen for business 
under a new name. 13 Prior to the enactment of the Maryland construc-
tion trust statute, Maryland corporate law protected individual officers, 
directors, and employees from debts of the corporation, thereby allowing 
an individual engaged in the construction business to avoid personallia-
bility for the corporation's debts in most circumstances. 14 Thus, an un-
scrupulous individual could establish a thinly capitalized construction 
company, use funds from a project to pay handsome salaries to the com-
pany's officers, and be fairly confident that the officers would not be per-
sonally responsible for the debts of lower-tiered subcontractors and 
suppliers. 
An obvious deterrent to a recalcitrant contractor or subcontractor, 
who, by nonpayment of lower-tiered subcontractors, allows mechanics' 
lien claims to be asserted, is the imposition of some personal penalty 
upon the officers, directors, or employees of the unscrupulous company. 
A number of states have imposed criminal sanctions upon individuals 
whose companies fail to pay lower-tiered subcontractors out of funds re-
ceived on a construction project. ls Other states have created civil reme-
dies against the officers of a defaulting company.16 
When the Maryland Senate initially addressed this problem, it 
sought to establish both criminal sanctions and civilliability,17 As origi-
nally drafted, the senate bill designated monies received by a contractor 
or a subcontractor on a construction project as trust funds for the pay-
ment of sums due to lower-tiered subcontractors. IS Any officer, director, 
or employee of the contractor or subcontractor who, with intent to de-
fraud, retained or used the monies held in trust for any purpose other 
than to pay lower-tiered subcontractors was guilty of larceny, and was 
13. A major subcontractor's financial failure precipitates a chain reaction due to the 
accumulation of unpaid monies to their subcontractors and suppliers that must be 
repaid by the owner or general contractor to free the project from mechanics' liens. 
Virtually every major construction project sees a subcontractor fail financially. 
To the extent that the retainage is inadequate to cover the unpaid subcontractors 
and suppliers of the failed subcontractor for work performed, the general contractor 
or owner must make up that difference. Usually the failed subcontractor simply 
reopens business under a new name and continues to plague our industry. Letter 
from Phillip W. Worral to the Hon. WaIter M. Baker (Mar. 10, 1987). 
14. See e.g., Ace Development Co. v. Harrison, 196 Md. 357, 366, 76 A.2d 566, 570 
(1950) (absent fraud, corporate agent not personally liable on corporate contract). 
15. For an excellent discussion of state court decisions imposing criminal sanctions, see 
Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Providing Criminal Penalties for 
Failure of Contractor who has Received Payment from Owner to Pay Laborers or 
Materialmen, 78 A.L.R.3D 563 (1977). 
16. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 152, 153 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988). 
17. 1987 Md. Laws 1932 (Senate Bill 374). 
18. Id. § 9·115, 1987 Md. Laws 1932. 
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subject to a maximum fine not to exceed $5,000, and imprisonment of not 
more than one year. 19 In addition to criminal sanctions, the original sen-
ate bill would have imposed civil personal liability upon any officer, di-
rector, or employee of any contractor or subcontractor for these 
actions. 20 
The enacted version of the Maryland construction trust statute is 
similar to the senate bill with one important exception. The statute re-
tains the personal liability provision but deletes the criminal sanctions.21 
The statute creates an express trust consisting of monies received by a 
contractor or subcontractor on a construction project.22 Despite the cre-
ation of the express trust, the statute does not require the contractor or 
subcontractor to place the funds in a separate account. 23 Additionally, 
the statute requires proof of "intent to defraud" to impose personalliabil-
ity on officers, directors, and employees.24 Mere use of the trust funds 
for any purpose other than payment of subcontractors, however, consti-
tutes prima facie evidence of the required intent.2s The statute applies to 
both private and public construction projects,26 but not to contracts for 
the construction and sale of a single family residential dwelling,27 or 
home improvement contracts by licensed home improvement 
contractors. 28 
III. PERSONAL LIABILITY OF OFFICERS, DIRECTORS, 
AND EMPLOYEES 
A. Language in the Construction Trust Statute 
The primary issue under the Maryland construction trust statute is 
determining which circumstances will result in personal liability for of-
ficers, directors, and employees. Because there are no Maryland deci-
sions interpreting the statute, resolution of this issue requires an analysis 
of the statutory language as well as a review of relevant decisions from 
other states. 
The scope of the statutory language is broad. "Any officer, director, 
or employee" is subject to personal liability.29 Although officers, direc-
tors, and employees of a contractor or subcontractor are not liable under 
section 9-202 of the Real Property Code solely on account of their status, 
the activities which subject them to personal liability are broad. Any per-
son defined in the statute who "retains or uses" trust funds for any pur-
19. Id. § 9-116(b), 1987 Md. Laws 1933. 
20. Id. § 9-118, 1987 Md. Laws 1933-34 .. 
21. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-202 (1988). 
22. Id. § 9-201(a). 
23. Id. § 9-201(b). 
24. Id. § 9-202. 
25. Id. § 9-203. 
26. Id. § 9-204(a). 
27. Id. § 9-204(b)(1). 
28. Id. § 9-204(b)(2). 
29. Id. § 9-202. 
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pose other than to pay lower-tiered subcontractors, "with intent to 
defraud," is personally liable to any person damaged by the action.30 
The phrase "retains or uses" raises a number of questions concerning the 
type of involvement which will result in personal liability. Certainly some 
officers, directors, or employees such as the comptroller or project man-
ager will have direct involvement or control over the use of trust funds. 
Others, while not directly involved in the use or retention of trust funds, 
may nevertheless be sufficiently involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the company to also be subject to personal liability. Furthermore, the 
issue will arise whether an individual with knowledge of the diversion of 
trust funds, but with no direct role in either the daily operation of the 
company or the diversion of trust funds, will be personally liable. 
The "intent to defraud" requirement is closely related to the analy-
sis of what type of involvement in the diversion of trust funds is neces-
sary to subject an officer, director, or employee to personal liability. 
Although the "intent to defraud" language appears to restrict the scope 
of personal liability, the statute provides that the use of trust funds for 
any purpose other than to pay lower-tiered subcontractors is "prima fa-
cie evidence of intent to defraud."31 Accordingly, proof of diversion of 
trust funds will enable the plaintiff to survive a motion for judgment on 
this issue. 
B. Judicial Construction of Similar Maryland Statutes 
Presently, the breadth to which the Maryland courts will construe 
personal liability under the construction trust statute is unclear. Never-
theless, Comptroller v. House,32 a decision of the court of special appeals 
under a similar statute, suggests that the courts will broadly interpret the 
personal liability provision of section 9-io2 of the Real Property Code. 
Comptroller v. House involved the interpretation of section 312(h)(4) 
of Article 81 of the Maryland Annotated Code, which imposes personal 
liability on an officer of a corporation "who exercises direct control over 
the fiscal management of the corporation," in the event that the corpora-
tion fails to withhold tax from employee wages.33 One issue in that case 
was whether an individual (House), who was the corporation's majority 
30.Id. 
31. Id. § 9-203. 
32. 68 Md. App. 560, 514 A.2d 496 (1986). 
33. Section 312(h)(4) provided as follows: 
Any employer who negligently shall fail either to withhold the required 
tax or to pay it to the Comptroller as specified, or both, shall be held 
personally and individually liable for all monies so involved, and if the 
employer is a corporate entity, the personal liability shall extend and be 
applicable to (1) any officer of the corporation who exercises direct control 
over the fiscal management of the corporation and (2) any agent of the 
corporation who, in his capacity as such, is under a duty to withhold the 
tax and transmit to the Comptroller. Any sum or sums withheld in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this section shall be deemed to be held by 
the employer in trust for the State of Maryland and by such employer 
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shareholder, a director, and chairman of the board, was also an officer 
who exercised "direct control over the fiscal management of the corpora-
tion."34 Another individual was responsible for the day-to-day operation 
of the corporation, although House on occasion had participated in busi-
ness decisions.35 The Maryland Tax Court found that House was liable 
for the taxes;36 the Baltimore City Circuit Court subsequently reversed 
the tax court.37 
The court of special appeals agreed with the tax court, holding that 
the circuit court's construction of the term "direct control" as meaning 
day-to-day control was "inordinately narrow and contravenes the intent 
of art. 81, § 312(h)(4)."38 Since House advised the president of the cor-
poration of potential business opportunities and risks, involved himself in 
the acquisition of a piece of equipment essential to the corporation's busi-
ness, and played a significant role in attempting to extricate the corpora-
tion from its financial problems, House exercised "direct control" and 
was personally liable under section 312(h)(4).39 
The importance of Comptroller v. House in construing the Maryland 
construction trust statute is revealed by comparison of the language of 
the construction trust statute with the language of article 81, section 
312(h)(4) of the Maryland Annotated Code. Both statutes create trusts 
and personal liability of corporate officers who violate the trustS.40 The 
court's decision not to give an "inordinately narrow"41 construction to 
section 312(h)(4) suggests that the court would not give a narrow con-
struction to the personal liability provision of the construction trust 
statute. 
A review of decisions in other jurisdictions with statutes similar to 
the Maryland construction trust statute may be instructive in assessing 
which circumstances will produce personal liability in Maryland. Execu-
tion of certain standard documents used in the construction industry 
may prove actual participation in the diversion of trust funds. For exam-
ple, on most construction projects a contractor will submit to the owner 
"Applications and Certificates for Payment." In Au Bon Pain Corp. v. 
Artect, Inc. ,42 an officer's execution of these forms on a project was suffi-
cient to prove personal liability under the Michigan construction trust 
recorded in a ledger account so as clearly to indicate the amount of tax 
withheld and that such amount is the property of the State of Maryland. 
MD. ANN. CODE art. 81, § 312(h)(4) (1980). 
34. House, 68 Md. App. at 562, 514 A.2d at 497. 
35. [d. at 563-64, 514 A.2d at 498. 
36. [d. at 565, 514 A.2d at 499. 
37. [d. at 567, 514 A.2d at 499. 
38. [d. at 568, 514 A.2d at 500. 
39. [d. 
40. Compare MD. ANN. CODE, art. 81, § 312(h)(4) (1980) with MD. REAL PROP. CODE 
ANN. §§ 9-201, 9-202 (1988). 
41. House, 68 Md. App. at 568, 514 A.2d at 500. 
42. 653 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1981). 
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statute.43 
In Au Bon Pain Corp., the plaintiff, an owner/operator of a chain of 
retail bake shops, had hired an architectural firm to design several bake 
shops and a contracting company to build the facilities. The two individ-
ual defendants in the action were partners in the architectural firm and 
also officers of the contracting company. During the course of construc-
tion the owner paid the contracting company substantial sums, but the 
contracting company failed to pay various subcontractors. After the 
owner satisfied subcontractor claims, the owner sued the contracting 
company and the two officers for the amounts paid to discharge the sub-
contractor claims.44 
At trial, the owner introduced into evidence "Applications and Cer-
tificates for Payment" signed by an officer on behalf of the contracting 
company.4S The owner argued that under the Michigan construction 
trust statute, the officer was personally liable for diversion of funds held 
in trust by the contractor for amounts due subcontractors.46 The district 
court held that the owner had failed to establish its prima facie case and 
dismissed the action.47 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit re-
43. Michigan law on the subject provides: 
570.151 Building contract fund; status as a trust fund 
Sec. 1. In the building construction industry, the building contract fund 
paid by any person to a contractor, or by such person or contractor to a 
subcontractor, shall be considered by this act to be a trust fund, for the 
benefit of the person making the payment, contractors, laborers, subcon-
tractors or materialmen, and the contractor or subcontractor shall be con-
sidered the trustee of all funds so paid to him for building construction 
purposes. 
570.152 Same; fraudulent detention or use by contractor or subcontrac-
tor, penalty 
Sec. 2. Any contractor or subcontractor engaged in the building con-
struction business, who, with intent to defraud, shall retain or use the pro-
ceeds or any part therefor, of any payment made to him, for any other 
purpose than to first pay laborers, subcontractors and materialmen, en-
gaged by him to perform labor or furnish material for the specific improve-
ment, shall be guilty of felony in appropriating such funds to his own use 
while any amount for which he may be liable or become liable under the 
terms of his contract for such labor or material remains unpaid, and may 
be prosecuted upon the complaint of any persons so defrauded, and, upon 
conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not less than 100 dollars or more 
than 5,000 dollars and/or not less than 6 months nor more than 3 years 
imprisonment in a state prison at the discretion of the court. 
570.153 Same; evidence of fraudulent detention or use 
Sec. 3. The appropriation by a contractor, or any subcontractor, of any 
monies paid to him for building operations before the payment by him of 
all monies due or so to become due laborers, subcontractors, materialmen 
or others entitled to payment, shall be evidence of intent to defraud. 
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 570.151 - 570.153 (West 1967). 
44. Au Bon Pain Corp., 653 F.2d at 63. 
45. [d. 
46. [d. at 64. 
47. [d. at 65. 
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versed, holding that the officer's signature on the "Applications and Cer-
tificates for Payment" was sufficient to produce personal liability under 
the Michigan construction trust statute.48 
The Michigan statute has the same "retain or use" language which 
triggers personal liability under the Maryland statute. If Maryland 
courts follow the Michigan approach, the execution of "Applications and 
Certificates for Payment" may be construed to subject an individual to 
personal liability in Maryland. 
New York courts have also addressed the issue of personal liability 
under the New York construction trust statute.49 At issue in In re 
Polidoro 50 was whether the debtor, an officer, director, and shareholder 
of a contracting company, had debts under the New York statute which 
were nondischargeable in bankruptcy.51 The bankruptcy court deter-
mined that the debtor was personally liable under the New York con-
struction trust statute as a result of mere knowledge of diversion of trust 
funds. 52 
The court in In re Polidoro relied in part upon Schwadron v. 
Freund. 53 Schwadron involved a claim by purchasers of property in a 
development against officers, directors, and shareholders of the develop-
ment company. 54 The purchasers alleged that the development company 
diverted funds paid by the purchasers and that the defendants were liable 
for their participation in the diversion. 55 Interpreting the New York 
construction trust statute, 56 the court stated that an individual who "ac-
tively" participated in the diversion, or had knowledge of the diversion, 
was liable under the statute. 57 The court determined as a matter of law 
that the president, who regularly signed corporate checks, who received 
wages of $2,000 during the time plaintiffs made payments to the develop-
ment company, and who did not deny having knowledge of the receipt 
and intended use of such funds, was personally liable. 58 The court denied 
summary judgment with respect to other defendants. 59 One defendant 
denied personally receiving or withdrawing funds from the development 
company, and evidence that he co-signed checks payable to contractors, 
48.Id. 
49. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70-79a (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1988). 
50. 12 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. E.n.N.Y. 1981). 
51. Id. at 868. 
52. Id. at 870-71. For a more detailed discussion of this decision, see infra text accom-
panying notes 123-26. 
53. 69 Misc. 2d 342, 329 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1972). 
54. Id. at 343,329 N.Y.S.2d 949. 
55.Id. 
56. Pursuant to the New York construction trust statute, a party damaged by a breach 
of trust may recover for "breach of trust or participation therein." N.Y. LIEN LAW 
§ 77(3)(a)(i) (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1988). 
57. Schwadron, 69 Misc. 2d at 348, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 954. 
58. Id. at 349, 329 N.Y.S.2d at 954. 
59.Id. 
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materialmen, and suppliers was inconclusive of his liability.60 
The personal liability of husband and wife teams has been explored 
. in decisions under the Wisconsin61 and Oklahoma62 construction trust 
statutes. In re Thomas 63 involved the nondischargeability of debts in 
bankruptcy under the Wisconsin statute64 by a husband and wife en-
gaged in the landscaping business.65 Although the bankruptcy court and 
the district court found that the wife was not liable under the Wisconsin 
statute, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit disagreed. The Sev-
enth Circuit held that when the wife deposited payments received from 
the plaintiffs and then disbursed the proceeds, she participated suffi-
ciently in the diversion of trust funds to be liable under the statute. 66 
The husband and wife debtors in the case of In re Fisher 67 were 
involved in the residential construction business in Oklahoma. The wife 
maintained the books and wrote out checks at the request and direction 
6O.Id. 
61. The pertinent Wisconsin law states as follows: 
Theft by Contractors. All monies, bonds or warrants paid or to become 
due to any prime contractor or subcontractor for public improvements are 
a trust fund only in the hands of the prime contractor or subcontractor 
and shall not be a trust fund in the hands of any other person. The use of 
the monies by the prime contractor or subcontractor for any purpose other 
than the payment of claims on such public improvement, before the claims 
have been satisfied, constitutes theft by the prime contractor or subcon-
tractor and is punishable under § 943.20. This section shall not create a 
civil cause of action against any person other than the prime contractor or 
subcontractor to whom such monies are paid or become due. Until all 
claims are paid in full, have matured by notice and filing or have expired, 
such money, bonds and warrants shall not be subject to garnishment, exe-
cution, levy or attachment. 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 779.16 (West 1981). 
62. The Oklahoma construction trust statute provides: 
§ 152. Proceeds of building or remodeling contracts, mortgages or war-
ranty deeds as trust' funds for payment of lienable claims. 
(1) The amount payable under any building or remodeling contract 
shall, upon receipt by any contractor or subcontractor, be held as trust 
funds for the payment of all lienable claims due and owing or to become 
due and owing by such contractors or subcontractors by reason of such 
building or remodeling contract. . 
§ 153. Payment of lienable claims. 
(1) Such trust funds shall be applied to the payment of such valid lien-
able claims and no portion thereof shall be used for any other purpose 
until all lienable claims due and owing or to become due and owing shall 
have been paid. 
(2) If the party receiving any money under Section 152 shall be a corpo-
ration, such corporation and its managing officers shall be liable for the 
proper application of such trust funds. 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, §§ 152, 153 (West 1979 & Supp. 1988). 
63. 729 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1984). 
64. See supra note 61. 
65. In re Thomas, 729 F.2d at 503. 
66. Id. at 504 n.4. 
67. 22 Bankr. 896 (Bankr. W.O. Okla. 1982). 
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of her husband; occasionally she would sign checks. Both the husband 
and wife signed the mortgage pertaining to the development of property 
by their company.68 The court determined that the mortgage proceeds 
were trust funds, and that a diversion of trust funds had occurred under 
the Oklahoma statute.69 Although the court found the husband liable for 
diversion of the trust funds, the wife was not liable because she was "an 
accommodation signatory to the mortgage" so that the mortgagee could 
protect itself from "possible spouse claims. "70 
One may question the holding of In re Fisher. The wife maintained 
the company's books, and therefore would appear to have participated in 
the diversion of trust funds. The mortgagee may have requested the 
wife's signature to protect itself against spousal claims, however, that 
does not alter the fact that she played a substantial role in the business.7l 
In Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale,72 a supplier of a steel 
fabrication company sued three individuals (Conley, Hale, and Ruby) 
who were shareholders, officers and directors of the steel fabrication 
company for diversion of trust funds under the Texas and Oklahoma 
construction trust statutes. 73 The supplier claimed that the steel 
fabrication company was paid funds on several projects but failed to pay 
the amounts due the supplier. Conley was the president and general 
manager, and was responsible for soliciting most of the company's busi-
ness and preparing bids. He hired and fired employees, purchased rou-
tine supplies and equipment, consulted with Hale and Ruby on all major 
purchases of equipment, and signed jointly with Hale most of the com-
pany's checks. Hale was a director and secretary-treasurer; Ruby was a 
director and vice-president. Every month they received copies of bank 
deposits and financial reports. Hale took a more active part in the daily 
management of the company than Ruby. As the company became finan-
cially distressed, Conley resigned as general manager, and Hale took over 
the managerial responsibilities for the company. Hale and Conley also 
discussed which creditors would be paid out of the company's funds. 
One of the creditors paid was a company owned by Hale. Ruby's role in 
the company was passive and generally limited to that of a director. No 
evidence indicated that Ruby participated in any decision to favor certain 
creditors over others.74 
Since the supplier furnished materials for projects in both Texas and 
Oklahoma, the court analyzed the defendants' liability in accordance 
with the trust statutes of both states.7S With respect to the Texas stat-
68. Id. at 897. 
69. Id. at 898. 
70.Id. 
71. In re Fisher has not been cited by any other decision. 
72. 355 F. Supp. 193 (N.D. Tex.), aff'd, 479 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1973). 
73. Id. at 195. 
74.Id. 
75. Id. at 197. 
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ute,76 the court determined that personal liability depended upon 
whether the individuals "controlled" or "directed" any funds received by 
their company on the project.77 The court held that Conley and Hale 
were liable because they had exercised control and direction over the 
trust funds on the Texas project.78 Conversely, Ruby was not liable be-
cause there was no evidence that he exercised power over the disburse-
ment of funds on the Texas project.79 
Under the Oklahoma statute,80 the court found that Conley and 
Hale were personally liable as "managing officers"81 and again concluded 
that Ruby's passive role was insufficient to support a finding of personal 
liability. 82 The court specifically held that Ruby's status as a stock-
holder, officer, and director was insufficient to show that he was a "man-
aging officer."83 Ruby's lack of participation in the day-to-day 
operations of the business, such as signing checks and consulting with 
employees on a regular basis, convinced the court that he was not liable 
under the Oklahoma statute. 84 
In Black v. O'Haver,85 an officer involved with the daily operation of 
a construction project was found personally liable under the Oklahoma 
construction trust statute. 86 The defendant O'Haver was an officer of a 
construction company which was building an apartment complex project 
funded by a mortgage company. When the project suffered financial dif-
ficulties, various subcontractors asserted lien claims.87 The court master 
determined that an amount greater than the sum of the lien claims was 
applied by the construction company to purposes other than the lien 
claims.88 O'Haver admitted that he bought materials, dealt with subcon-
76. The pertinent portion of the Texas statute in effect at the time of the court's decision 
was as follows: 
All monies or funds paid to a ... subcontractor. .. under a construction 
contract for the improvement of specific real property in this state, ... are 
hereby declared to be Trust Funds for the benefit of the . . . materialmen 
who may ... furnish ... material for the construction ... of any ... 
building or improvement whatever upon such real property; provided, 
however, that monies paid to a ... subcontractor ... may be used to pay 
reasonable overhead of said ... subcontractor, ... directly related to such 
construction contract. The ... subcontractor, ... or any officer, director 
or agent thereof ... having control or direction of same, is hereby made 
and constituted a Trustee of such funds ... under his control or direction. 
1967 Tex. Gen. Laws 770, recodified as amended, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. 
§§ 162.001-.032 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1988). 
77. Nuclear Corp. of America, 355 F. Supp. at 197. 
78.Id. 
79.Id. 
80. See supra note 62. 




85. 567 F.2d 361 (lOth Cir. 1977). 
86. Id. at 364. 
87.Id. 
88. Id. at 366. 
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tractors, wrote checks to subcontractors, signed payroll checks, and 
made bank loans for the project. 89 Distinguishing Nuclear Corp. of 
America, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that O'Haver 
was a "managing officer" under the Oklahoma statute and was therefore 
personally liable for the diversion of trust funds received from the mort-
gage company.90 The court concluded that O'Haver was liable under the 
statute since he exercised his power to disburse corporate funds, took an 
active role in the construction company's daily affairs, and was in "com-
plete active control" of the construction project.91 
These Tenth Circuit decisions provide strong guidance for interpre-
tation of the Maryland statute. In interpreting the Texas and Oklahoma 
statutes, the standard used for determining personal liability was whether 
the individuals "controlled" or "directed" the diversion of trust funds. 
The "controlled" or "directed" language in the Texas statute might be 
compared with the "retains or uses" language in the Maryland statute. 
Accordingly, Nuclear Corp. of America and Black v. O'Haver support an 
interpretation of the Maryland statute which finds that individuals who 
are not involved in the daily operation of a company, and who make no 
decisions concerning the disbursement of trust funds, are not personally 
liable. Further, these decisions support the proposition that under the 
Maryland construction trust statute one's position in a corporation alone 
will not be a sufficient basis for liability. 
In summary, several observations can be made concerning the cir-
cumstances under which the Maryland courts may find personal liability. 
The broad statutory language and the decisions of other jurisdictions in-
dicate that an officer, director, or employee who is actively involved with 
the day-to-day operations of a company is likely to be found personally 
liable. Conversely, those who have no active participation in the daily 
operation of the business, or the diversion of the trust funds, will proba-
bly not be personally liable. Despite the breadth of the statutory lan-
guage, an individual's mere status as an officer, director, or employee 
does not appear to be sufficient to establish personal liability. 
IV. FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
MARYLAND CONSTRUCTION TRUST STATUTE. 
A. Provisions of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and the Construction 
Trust Statute 
Individuals held personally liable under the Maryland construction 
trust statute are likely to seek relief under the Federal Bankruptcy 
Code.92 One of the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide the 
89. Id. at 367-68. 
90. Id. at 368. 
91. Id. 
92. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
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debtor a "fresh start" unhampered by preexisting debt.93 This policy of 
the Bankruptcy Code is also implicitly set forth in sections 727, 1141, 
1228 and 1328, which generally pertain to discharge of the debtor's ante-
cedent debts. 94 
The question arises as to whether the primary purpose of the Mary-
land statute - the imposition of personal liability upon the wrongful 
diverters of trust funds - may be circumvented by the diverters' seeking 
relief under the bankruptcy laws. In order to answer this question, a 
closer look at the Bankruptcy Code provisions relating to discharge of 
the debtor is necessary. 
Despite the provision for a general discharge of debts provided by 
the Bankruptcy Code, not all debts are discharged in bankruptcy. The 
Bankruptcy Code provides that in certain situations, specific categories 
of debts are not discharged.9s Of particular importance is section 
523(a)( 4), which provides: 
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 
1328(b) of this title does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt -
* * * * 
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity, embezzlement, or larceny;96 
Although the Maryland construction trust statute does not enumer-
ate criminal penalties for diversion of trust funds, the language of the 
statute appears to create a fiduciary relationship. Section 9-201(a) of the 
Real Property Code creates an express trust, and contractors or subcon-
tractors receiving the trust funds hold such funds as a trustee.97 Further-
more, personal liability under section 9-202 depends upon a finding of 
"intent to defraud. "98 Thus, it appears that the language of the Mary-
land construction trust statute creates a fiduciary obligation sufficient to 
except the debt of an individual based upon the statute from discharge 
under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
B. Judicial Construction of Similar Statutes in Other Jurisdictions 
Considerable case law exists interpreting state statutes similar to the 
Maryland construction trust statute concerning the issue of dis-
chargeability of debts under section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code. 
The general rule is that if the state statute contains an express provision 
creating a trust, then an individual's debt resulting from diversion of the 
93. See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 
637, 648 (1971); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
94. 11 U.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1228, 1328 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). 
95. See id. § 523. 
96. Id. § 523(a)(4). 
97. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-201(a) (1988). 
98. Id. § 9-202. 
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trust funds is nondischargeable under section 523(a)(4).99 
In re Thomas 100 examined the nondischargeability of debts arising 
out of the Wisconsin construction trust statute pertaining to public im-
provements. 101 As discussed above,102 the bankrupt debtors were a hus-
band and wife engaged in the landscaping business. A general contractor 
who hired the debtors to perform landscaping work objected to the debt-
ors' discharge under section 523(a)(4) and (6). The general contractor 
claimed that it paid the debtors substantial sums on a project, and that 
the debtors used the monies received for purposes other than paying sup-
pliers and completing the contract work.103 Both the bankruptcy court 
and the district court held that the husband, but not the wife, was acting 
in a fiduciary capacity with respect to the general contractor under the 
Wisconsin statute, and that some of the debt the husband owed to the 
general contractor was nondischargeable. 104 
The general contractor appealed on the grounds that more of the 
debt was nondischargeable; the defendants did not cross-appeal. lOS Be-
cause the wife played a major role in the landscaping business, the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found that the general contractor had 
a right to proceed not only against the husband but also against the 
wife. 106 Accordingly, both the husband and wife were liable to the gen-
eral contractor for nondischargeable debts under section 523(a)(4).107 
The effect of the Michigan construction trust statute lO8 on the 
nondischargeability of debts under section: 523(a)(4) was analyzed in In 
re Johnson. 109 The major supplier of materials for three of the debtor's 
projects filed a complaint to declare the debts nondischargeable under 
the predecessor to section 523(a)(4).110 The supplier contended that 
under the Michigan construction trust statute, the debtor was a "fiduci-
ary" with respect to the payments received from the owners, and there-
fore, the debtor's failure to pay the supplier and the debtor's use of the 
money for personal and non-project related business expenses was a 
breach of the debtor's fiduciary duties, constituting a "defalcation" or 
99. See, e.g., In re Thomas; 729 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Johnson, 691 F.2d 249 
(6th Cir. 1982); Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980); In re 
Weedman, 65 Bankr. 288 (Bankr. w.n. Ky. 1986); In re Polidoro, 12 Bankr. 867 
(Bankr. E.n.N.Y. 1981); In re Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. 413 (W.n.N.Y. 1977). 
100. 729 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1984). 
10 1. See supra note 61. 
102. See supra text accompanying notes 63-66. 
103. In re Thomas, 729 F.2d at 503. 
104. Id. at 504. 
105.Id. 
106. Id. at 504 n.4. 
107. Id. at 507. 
108. See supra note 43. 
109. 691 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1982) (debtor was engaged in the business of constructing 
pole barns and other structures). 
110. Id. at 250-51. The predecessor to section 523(a)(4) of title 11 of the United States 
Code was section 17(a)( 4) of the Bankruptcy Act, which contained similar language. 
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"misappropriation." III 
The bankruptcy court held that the Michigan construction trust 
statute did not make the debtor a "fiduciary," noting that no facts indi-
cated intentional or bad faith "defalcation" or "misappropriation."112 
The district court affirmed on the grounds that the supplier failed to 
prove that the debtor acted in bad faith or with intent to defraud. 113 On 
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed two issues: 
first, whether the debtor was a "fiduciary" under the Michigan construc-
tion trust statute, and second, whether specific intent or bad faith is nec-
essary to constitute a "defalcation" or "misappropriation" under the 
predecessor to section 523(a)( 4).114 
The Sixth Circuit analyzed the provisions of the Michigan construc-
tion trust statute and held that the debtor was a fiduciary under the stat-
ute. lIS The court determined that the term "fiduciary" applies only to 
express technical trusts, not to trusts which are imposed as a matter of 
equity,116 and that the trust relationship must exist prior to the act creat-
ing the debt and without reference to the debt.ll7 Examining the perti-
nent statutory language, the court held that the Michigan construction 
trust statute created an express trust arising prior to and separate from 
the act which created the debt and that intent or bad faith was not neces-
sary to show a "defalcation."118 
In Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell,119 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit interpreted the Oklahoma construction trust statute. 120 The 
court found that the filing of bankruptcy by the debtor, the managing 
officer of a residential construction company, did not discharge his debts 
to a supplier, because the Oklahoma statute created an express trust, and 
because the debtor was a "fiduciary" within the meaning of the predeces-
sor to section 523(a)( 4).121 
Violations of the New York construction trust statutel22 also result 
in nondischargeable debts. In re Polidoro 123 involved a debtor who was 
an officer, director, and shareholder of a contracting company which had 
purchased products from a supplier on open account for several projects. 
Although the debtor's company received full payment on the projects, 
the company did not pay the supplier. Instead, with the debtor's knowl-
edge, it paid other obligations such as salaries, wages, general overhead 




115. [d. at 254. 
116. [d. at 251. 
117. [d. at 252. 
118. [d. at 254, 257. 
119. 615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980). 
120. See supra note 62. 
121. Carey Lumber Co., 615 F.2d at 372-75. 
122. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70-79a (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1988). 
123. 12 Bankr. 867 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
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expenses, and other debts.124 The bankruptcy court held that the 
debtor's obligation to the supplier under the New York statute was non-
dischargeable under section 523(a)(4).12S In reaching its decision, the 
court found that since the New York statute created a trust relationship 
before the misapplication of funds, the debtor was a "fiduciary" under 
section 523(a)(4) and the debt was therefore nondischargeable. 126 
In re Kawczynski,127 also interpreting the New York construction 
trust statute,128 involved an individual debtor engaged in the homebuild-
ing business who failed to pay in full a subcontractor and supplier. The 
debtor had received payments from the owner and used some of the pay-
ments for purposes other than paying unpaid subcontractors and suppli-
ers.129 The unpaid subcontractor and supplier objected to the debtor's 
discharge under the predecessor to section 523(a)(4), but the bankruptcy 
court declared the debts dischargeable. 130 The district court reversed, 
holding that the New York statute created an express trust for the benefit 
of subcontractors and suppliers arising prior to any wrongdoing by the 
debtor. Therefore, the debtor was a "fiduciary" under the predecessor to 
section 523(a)(4).13l As a result, the debtor's obligations to the unpaid 
subcontractor and supplier were nondischargeable. 132 The court also de-
termined that the debtor's use of trust funds for legitimate business pur-
poses, such as paying overhead expenses, nevertheless amounted to a 
diversion of trust funds and thus constituted a "defalcation" under the 
predecessor to section 523(a)(4).133 
Finally, In re Weedman 134 analyzed the Kentucky construction 
trust statute. 135 The debtor was a homebuilder who- received full pay-
124. Id. at 868-69. 
125. Id. at 871. 
126.Id. 
127. 442 F. Supp. 413 (W.n.N.Y. 1977). 
128. N.Y. LIEN LAW §§ 70-79a (McKinney 1966 & Supp. 1988). 
129. In re Kawczynski, 442 F. Supp. at 415. 
130.Id. 
131. Id. at 417. 
132. Id. at 418. 
133. Id. at 417-18. 
134. 65 BanIa. 288 (Bankr. w.n. Ky. 1986). 
135. The Kentucky construction trust statute provides: 
(1) Any contractor, architect or other person who builds, repairs or im-
proves the property of another under such circumstances that a 
mechanic's or materialman's lien may be imposed on the property shall, 
from the proceeds of any payment received from the owner, pay in full all 
persons who have furnished material or performed labor on the property. 
(2) If any payment by the owner to the contractor, architect or other 
person is not sufficient to pay in full all bills for material and labor, then 
such claims shall be paid on a pro rata basis to the amount of payments 
received, unless otherwise agreed between the contractor, architect or 
other person and the holder of the claim for material or labor. 
(3) This section shall not apply where persons furnishing material or per-
forming labor have waived in writing their right to file mechanics' or ma-
terialmen's liens. 
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ment from the owner for a project but failed to pay one of his suppliers. 
The supplier obtained a lien against the owner's residence, the owner 
obtained a judgment against the debtor, and the debtor filed bank-
ruptcy.136 The bankruptcy court held that the Kentucky construction 
trust statute created an express trust prior to, and independent of, any 
claim of misappropriation. Therefore, the debtor was a "fiduciary" under 
section 523(a)(4).137 In addition, the failure to pay the supplier from the 
owner's payments to the debtor constituted a prima facie case of defalca-
tion under section 523(a)(4).138 
As the decisions interpreting the construction trust statutes of Wis-
consin, Michigan, Oklahoma, New York, and Kentucky indicate, the 
debtor becomes a "fiduciary" under section 523(a)(4) when the statute 
creates an express trust for the benefit of unpaid subcontractors. The 
Maryland construction trust statute also creates an express trust for the 
benefit of unpaid subcontractors. 139 Accordingly, it appears that an indi-
vidual officer, director, or employee found personally liable under the 
Maryland construction trust statute will be subject to section 523(a)( 4) of 
the Bankruptcy Code, and his debt will be nondischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 
In contrast to the decisions of the courts previously mentioned, a 
number of courts have analzyed statutes with a purpose similar to Mary-
land's construction trust statute and have found debts resulting from 
these statutes not to be within section 523(a)(4). Those decisions, how-
ever, construed statutory language quite different from the Maryland 
statute. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has analyzed not only the 
Oklahoma statute,14O but has also interpreted the Louisiana, Georgia, 
and Texas construction trust statutes. 141 In re Angelle 142 discussed the 
effect of a Louisiana criminal statute143 which imposed penalties upon a 
contractor or subcontractor who failed to pay claims for material and 
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 376.070 (Baldwin 1981). 
136. In re Weedman, 65 Bankr. at 290. 
137. Id. at 290-91. . 
138. Id. at 291. 
139. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-201(a) (1988). 
140. See Carey Lumber Co. v. Bell, 615 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1980). 
141. See In re Boyle, 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987);In re Cross, 666 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 
1982);In re Angelle, 610 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1980). 
142. 610 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1980). 
143. Louisiana law at the time of the court's decision provided as follows: 
Any person, contractor or subcontractor or agent of a contractor or sub-
contractor who has applied any money received on account of any con-
tract including contracts and mortgages for interim financing, for the 
construction, erection, or repair of any building, structure, or other im-
provement to any other purpose than the settlement of claims for material 
and labor due or to become due for said construction or under the contract 
shall, in case of default on the contract, or default in payment of claims for 
material or labor, be fined not less than one hundred dollars nor more than 
five hundred dollars and imprisoned for not less than thirty days nor more 
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labor out of monies received from a project. In determining whether the 
individual debtor, a homebuilder, was a "fiduciary" under the predeces-
sor to section 523(a)(4) as a result of the Louisiana statute, the Fifth 
Circuit held that because no trust arose under the Louisiana statute prior 
to misappropriation, a debtor who violates the Louisiana statute is not a 
"fiduciary."I44 Therefore, any debt resulting from the Louisiana statute 
is dischargeable in bankiuptcy. Analyzing a similar Georgia statutel4S in 
In re Cross,146 the Fifth Circuit held that a debtor did not attain "fiduci-
ary" status through a criminal provision which prohibited the misappli-
cation with intent to defraud of money advanced for real property 
improvements. 147 Neither the Louisiana statute nor the Georgia statute, 
however, contained a provision creating an express trust.148 Accord-
ingly, these statutes may be distinguished from the Maryland construc-
tion trust statute. 
In In re Boyle,149 the Fifth Circuit held that under the Texas con-
struction trust statute, ISO the diverter's debts would be nondischargeable 
than six months, and in default of fine, imprisoned for not less than thirty 
days nor more than six months additional. 
1960 La. Acts 554, § 1, codified as amended, LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:202 (1986). 
144. In re Angel/e, 610 F.2d at 1336, 1340. 
145. Georgia Law provides as follows: 
(a) Any architect, landscape architect, engineer, contractor, subcontrac-
tor, or other person who with intent to defraud shall use the proceeds of 
any payment made to him on account of improving certain real property 
for any other purpose than to pay for labor or service performed on or 
materials furnished by his order for this specific improvement while any 
amount for which he may be or become liable for such labor, services, or 
materials remains unpaid commits a felony and, upon conviction thereof, 
shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one year nor more 
than five years or upon the recommendation of the jury or in the discretion 
of the trial judge, punished for a misdemeanor, provided that, in addition 
to the above sanctions, where a corporation's agent acts within the scope 
of his office or employment and on behalf of the corporation and with 
intent to defraud uses such proceeds for purposes other than for property 
improvements or where a corporation's board of directors or managerial 
official, the latter acting within the scope of his employment and on behalf 
of the corporation recklessly tolerates or, with intent to defraud, autho-
rizes, requests, or commands the use of such proceeds for purposes other 
than for property improvements, the corporation commits a felony and, 
upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than 
$1,000.00 nor more than $5,000.00. 
(b) A failure to pay for material or labor furnished for such property im-
provements shall be prima-facie evidence of intent to defraud. 
1941 Ga. Laws 480, § 1, recodified as amended, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-8-15 (1984). 
146. 666 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1982). 
147. Id. at 881 n.l3. 
148. Id.; see also supra notes 143, 145. 
149. 819 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1987). 
150. The relevant statutory provisions which the court analyzed were as follows: 
Section 162.001 
(a) Construction payments are trust funds under this chapter if the pay-
ments are made to a contractor or subcontractor or to an officer, director, 
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pursuant to section 523(a)(4) only if intent to defraud was shown. 151 The 
facts of In re Boyle, however, would probably lead to a different result 
under the Maryland statute. The plaintiff in that decision proved diver-
sion oftrust funds, but not wrongful intent. 152 Conversely, under section 
9-203 of the Maryland construction trust statute, proof of diversion is 
prima facie evidence of intent to defraud. ls3 Therefore, because the 
Texas statute had no provision similar to section 9-203, the holding in In 
re Boyle cannot be relied upon when interpreting the Maryland statute. 
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits, interpreting criminal statutes simi-
lar to the Louisiana and Georgia statuteS analyzed by the Fifth Circuit, 
found that the statutes created no express trust. Therefore, debts of a 
or agent of a contractor or subcontractor, under a construction contract 
for the improvement of specific real property in this state. 
(b) Loan receipts are trust funds under this chapter if the funds are bor-
rowed by a contractor, subcontractor, or owner or by an officer, director, 
or agent of a contractor, subcontractor, or owner for the purpose of im-
proving specific real property in this state, and the loan is secured in whole 
or in part by a lien on the property. 
Section 162.002 
A contractor, subcontractor, or owner, or an officer, director, or agent of a 
contractor, subcontractor, or owner, who receives trust funds or who has 
control or direction of trust funds, is a trustee of the trust funds. 
Section 162.003 
An artist, laborer, mechanic, contractor, subcontractor, or materialman 
who labors or who furnishes labor or material for the construction or re-
pair of an improvement on specific real property in this state is a benefici-
ary of any trust funds paid or received in connection with the 
improvement. 
Section 162.004 
(b) The Texas Trust Act ... does not apply to any trust created under 
this chapter . . . . 
Section 162.031 
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (b), a trustee who, with intent to 
defraud, directly or indirectly retains, uses, disburses, or otherwise diverts 
trust funds without first fully paying all obligations incurred by the trustee 
to the beneficiaries of the trust funds has misapplied the trust funds. 
(b) A trustee may use trust funds to pay the trustee's reasonable over-
head expenses that are directly related to the construction or repair of the 
improvement. 
Section 162.032 
(a) A trustee who misapplies trust funds amounting to less than $250 
commits an offense punishable by confinement in jail for not more than 
two years and by a fine of not more than $500 or by the confinement 
without the fine. 
(b) A trustee who misapplies trust funds amounting to $250 or more 
commits an offense punishable by imprisonment in the Texas Department 
of Corrections for not more than 10 years. 
[d. at 585-86 (quoting from TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.032 (Vernon 
1984». 
151. [d. at 592. 
152. [d. 
153. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 9-203 (1988). 
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contractor who misappropriated trust funds were dischargeable in 
bankruptcy. 154 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Maryland construction trust statute complements and rein-
forces the rights and responsibilities of contractors and subcontractors in 
the construction industry. Under the statute, officers, directors, and em-
ployees of contractors and subcontractors are exposed to personal liabil-
ity. Monies received by a contractor or subcontractor on a construction 
project are deemed to be held in trust for the payment of sums due to 
lower-tiered subcontractors. Any officer, director, or employee of a con-
tractor or subcontractor who, with intent to defraud, retains or uses the 
monies held in trust for any purpose other than to pay lower-tiered sub-
contractors is personally liable to any person damaged by such an action. 
Mere use of the trust funds for any purpose other than the payment of 
subcontractors on the project constitutes prima facie evidence of intent to 
defraud. Personal liability for diversion of trust funds probably extends 
only to officers, directors, or employees actively involved with the daily 
operations of a company. Accordingly, an individual's mere status as an 
officer, director, or employee is not likely to result in personal liability. 
Once an individual has been found liable under the statute, it ap-
pears that the individual will not be able to evade responsibility for the 
debt by filing bankruptcy. Section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code ex-
cepts from the general discharge in bankruptcy debts for fraud or defal-
cation while acting in a fiduciary capacity. Since the Maryland statute 
creates an express trust, an individual found liable is likely to be consid-
ered a "fiduciary" within the meaning of section 523(a)(4). As a result, 
the debt of an individual arising out of the Maryland statute is probably 
nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 
154. See In re Pedrazzini, 644 F.2d 756, 759 (9th Cir. 1981) (interpreting CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 484{b) (1988»; In re Dloogotf, 600 F.2d 166, 169-70 (8th Cir. 1979) (inter-
preting NEB. REv. STAT. § 52-123 (1984». 
